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Linkable ring signatures have found many attractive applications. One of the
recent important extensions is a linkable threshold ring signature scheme (LTRS).
Unfortunately, the existing LTRS schemes are only secure in the random oracle
model. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we construct
the first LTRS scheme that is secure without requiring the random oracle model.
Further, we enhance the security of a threshold ring signature (for both linkable or
non-linkable) by providing a stronger definition of anonymity. This strengthened
notion makes threshold ring signature schemes more suitable in the real life.
Finally, we provide efficient schemes that outperform the existing schemes in
the literature. Our scheme is particularly suitable for electronic commerce
or electronic government where anonymity and accountability are the most
concerned factors.
Keywords: Threshold; Linkable; Ring Signature; Random Oracles

1.

INTRODUCTION

no one can determine whether two ring signatures are
generated by the same signer.

Ring Signature. A ring signature scheme (such as
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]) allows members of a group
to sign messages on behalf of the group without
any necessity to reveal their identities, i.e., providing
signer anonymity. Additionally, it is impossible to
decide whether two signatures have been issued by the
same group member. In contrast to the notion of a
group signature scheme (such as [8, 9, 10]), the group
formation in a ring signature is spontaneous and there
exists no group manager who is responsible for revoking
the signer’s identity. That is, under the assumption that
each user is already associated with a public key of any
standard signature scheme, a user can form a group
by simply collecting the public keys of all the group
members including his own. These diversion group
members can be totally unaware of being conscripted
into the group.
Applications of ring signature schemes include whistle blowing [1], anonymous membership authentication
for ad hoc groups [11], non-interactive deniable ring authentication [12], smart grid systems [13], perfect concurrent signature [14] and multi-designated verifiers signature [15].
A “regular” ring signature is unlinkable. That is,
The Computer Journal,

Linkable Ring Signature. Linkable ring signatures
was first proposed by Liu et al. [16] in 2004. In this
notion, the identity of the signer in a ring signature
remains anonymous, but two ring signatures can be
linked if they are signed by the same signer. Linkable
ring signatures are suitable in many different practical
applications, such as ad-hoc network authentication
[16], e-voting [17] and e-cash [18].
Regular ring
signatures cannot be used for e-voting since any double
votes remain undetectable as they are unlinkable. No
one is able to find out whether any two signatures
(with two votes) are generated by the same voter or
not. Linkable ring signatures provide the remedy to this
problem by allowing the public to detect any signer who
has produced two or more signatures (i.e., votes).
We note that linkability is compulsorily embedded
into the signature instead of voluntarily added in
linkable ring signatures. If the signer refuses to add
the correct linking information, the whole signature
becomes invalid. In other words, linkability is enforced
by the verifier. The signer cannot decline to do so.
This is different from voluntarily added linkability. In
this case, whether allowing the signature to be linked
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or not can be decided by the signer. This issue is also
explained in [16].
Linkability can only happen within the same event
(e.g., a voting event). Two signatures from two different
events cannot be linked, even though they are generated
by the same signer. Although the earlier schemes such
as [16, 19, 20] do not mention about this property, they
can be modified trivially to achieve this property.
All previous linkable ring signature schemes (e.g.,
[21, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]) except the recent work
by Fujisaki [27] are only proven secure in the random
oracle model.
We also remark that Wang and Zhao [28] made some
cryptanalysis to a number of previous linkable ring
signature schemes. They also claimed that ”To design
secure linkable ring signature scheme is still an open
problem.”. In Appendix Appendix A, we demonstrate
that their cryptanalysis is indeed invalid and hence,
their claim is also incorrect.
Linkable Threshold Ring Signature. A (d, n)linkable threshold ring signature (LTRS) has the similar
notion to the (1-out-of-n) linkable ring signature. A
(d, n)-LTRS scheme requires at least d signers to work
collaboratively to generate a signature.
Those d
participating signers can select any set of n entities
including themselves without getting any consent
from those diversion group members. Linkability for
threshold ring signatures is diversified into individuallinkability and coalition-linkability. For individuallinkability, two signatures are linked if they share at
least one common signer even though the two identity
sets are different. On the other hand, two signatures are
coalition-linked if the signer sets are exactly the same.
There are only two LTRS schemes in the literature.
The first one was given by Tsang et al. in [21] which
allows a separate type of public key. Another LTRS
scheme was presented in [26] in ID-based setting. All of
them rely on random oracles for proving their security.

Applications.
In addition to the applications
described above for the non-threshold linkable ring
signature, the threshold variant can be useful in the
following situation. Assume there is an election for
a company chairman. All management committee
members are eligible to vote. Before the voting, each
candidate should have at least d nominations within
the management committee members. The nomination
process should be anonymous. One committee member
can only nominate one candidate. Otherwise, the
nomination becomes invalid. In this case, threshold
linkable ring signature can be deployed as it fulfills all
the requirement:
•
•
•

It provides anonymous to each nominator.
It can make sure each nominatee to have at least d
nominators.
If a committee member nominates more than one
The Computer Journal,

candidate, those two nominations can be linked
and will become invalid.
In the reality, the Hong Kong Chief Executive election
uses the same mode. There are a small group of
1200 election committee members that can vote for
the Chief Executive.
Each candidate should get
at least 150 committee members for the nomination
before becoming a candidate. The process should be
anonymous. Threshold linkable ring signature can be
fully suitable in this kind of nomination.

Our Contribution. The contribution of our paper can
be classified into the following area:
1.

2.

3.

We propose the first d-out-of-n Linkable Threshold
Ring Signature (LTRS) scheme provable secure
without random oracles.
All previous LTRS
schemes can be only proven secure in the random
oracle model.
We enhance the security of threshold ring signature
(linkable or non-linkable) by giving a stronger
definition of anonymity, called Anonymity under
Full Key Exposure and Insider Attack. Under this
stronger notion, the adversary is not only given
secret keys of the target users, it is also allowed
to interact with some honest users. All previous
threshold ring signature definition only allows the
adversary to have user secret keys.
We achieve better efficiency when compared to
other schemes (even with those rely on random
oracles):
(a) When compared with other LTRS schemes,
they require O(n2 ) for the linking complexity
while we can achieve O(d log d).
(b) Our scheme can be seen as a normal linkable
ring signature when we set the threshold value
d to 1. When compared to the Fujisaki scheme
[27], which is the only linkable ring signature
scheme that can be proven secure without
random oracles, the linking complexity of our
scheme is O(1) while the Fujisaki scheme
requires O(n log n).
(c) Our scheme can be easily modified to achieve
a regular threshold ring signature (i.e.,
without linkability), by using a different
event tag every time. When compared to
other threshold ring signature
schemes, our
√
signature size is O(d n) while all other
√
schemes require at least O(n). When d < n,
our signature size is smaller than all previous
schemes. If the threshold value d is a small
integer such as 2 or 3 while the value n is very
large, our signature size is very short when
compared to others.
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•

PRELIMINARIES

3

Sign: On input the message m and the secret key
1
α, the signer computes the signature σ = g α+m .
Verify: On input the message m, the signature σ
and the public key, output accept if ê(g α g m , σ) =
ê(g, g).

Pairings. We make use of bilinear groups of composite
order. Let N be a composite number with factorization
N = pq. G is a multiplicative cyclic group of order N .
Gp is its cyclic order-p subgroup, and Gq is its cyclic
order-q subgroup. GT is a multiplicative group of order
N . g is a generator of G. Then ê is a bilinear map such
that e : G × G → GT with the following properties:

The BB signature is existentially unforgeable under
the weak chosen message attack if the SDH assumption
holds in G.

•

3.

•
•

Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z,
ê(ua , v b ) = ê(u, v)ab .
Non-degeneracy: hê(g, g)i = GT whenever hgi = G.
Computability: It is efficient to compute ê(u, v) for
all u, v ∈ G.

•

We give our security model and define relevant security
notions.
3.1.

The group operations on G and GT can be performed
efficiently. Bit strings corresponding to elements of G
and of GT can be recognized efficiently.
Mathematical Assumptions. For our scheme, we
assume three problems are difficult to solve in the
setting described above.
Definition 2.1 (Q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) in
Q
2
Gp [29]). Given the tuple (gp , gpα , gpα , . . ., gpα ), where
1

Definition 2.3 (Q0 -Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion (DDHI) [27]). Given the tuple (g, A1 , A2 , . . . , AQ0 ),
where
( 1
g α+i , if i 6= τ ,
Ai =
R
if i = τ .

•

•

•

•

α ∈R ZN , R ∈ G, τ ∈ {1, . . . , Q0 }, decide whether
1
R = g α+τ .
These assumptions are formalized by measuring an
adversary’s success probability for SDH problem and
an adversary’s guessing advantage for the subgroup
decision problem and the DDHI problem.
Boneh-Boyen Signature. Boneh and Boyen [29]
proposed a short signature without random oracles.
This BB-signature will be used in our construction. We
briefly review the BB-signature here.
•

Setup: On input the security parameter λ, it
generates a pairing ê : G × G → GT , where G, GT
are cyclic groups of order p. Let g is a generator of
G. It randomly picks α ∈R Zp . The public key is
(p, G, GT , ê, g, g α ) and the secret key is α.
The Computer Journal,

Syntax of linkable threshold ring signature

A linkable threshold ring signature, (LTRS) scheme, is
a tuple of five algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify
and Link).

gp ∈R Gp , and α ∈R Zp , compute and output gpα+r ∈ Gp
and r ∈ Zp .
Definition 2.2 (Subgroup Decision in Gq [30]).
Given w selected at random either from G (with
probability 1/2) or from Gq (with probability 1/2),
decide whether w is in Gq . For this problem one is given
the description of G, but not given the factorization of
N.

SECURITY MODEL

•

param ← Setup(λ) is a PPT algorithm which, on
input a security parameter λ, outputs the set of
security parameters param which includes λ. We
denote by EID, M and Σ the domains of event-id,
messages and signatures, resp.
(ski , pki ) ← KeyGen(param) is a PPT algorithm
which, on input a security parameter λ ∈ N,
outputs a private/public key pair (ski , pki ). We
denote by SK and PK the domains of possible
secret keys and public keys, resp. When we say
that a public key corresponds to a secret key or
vice versa, we mean that the secret/public key pair
is an output of KeyGen.
σ ← Sign(e, n, d, Y, X , M ) which, on input event-id
e, group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y
of n public keys in PK, a set X of d private keys
whose corresponding public keys are all contained
in Y, and a message M , produces a signature σ.
accept/reject ← Verify(e, n, d, Y, M, σ) which, on
input event-id e, group size n, threshold d ∈
{1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a
message-signature pair (M ,σ) returns accept or
reject. If accept, the message-signature pair is
valid.
linked/unlinked
←
Link
(e, d, n1 , n2 , Y1 , Y2 , M1 , M2 ,,
σ1 ,
σ2 ) which,
on input event-id e, group size n1 , n2 (assume
n1 ≤ n2 ), threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n1 }, two sets
Y1 , Y2 of n1 , n2 public keys respectively, two valid
signature and message pairs (M1 , σ1 , M2 , σ2 ),
outputs linked or unlinked.

Remark: According to [18, 31], linkability for threshold
ring signatures is diversified into individual-linkability
and coalition-linkability, our definition belongs to the
former type. That is, in our definition two signatures
are linked if there exists at least one common
signer, while the later linkability only represents
whether two signatures share the exact same set of
Vol. ??,
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common signers even though the two public key sets
are different.
Correctness. LTRS schemes must satisfy:
•

•

3.2.

Definition 3.1 (unforgeability). A LTRS
scheme is unforgeable if for all PPT adversary A,
Advunf
A (λ) is negligible.
2.

(Verification Correctness.)
Signatures signed
according to specification are accepted during
verification.
(Linking Correctness.) If two signatures are signed
for the same event according to specification, then
they are linked if and only if the two signatures
share at least one common signer.

(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param.
(b) A may query the oracles according to any
adaptive strategy. Suppose A makes a total
number of v queries to CO. The restriction is
that: v < n − d.
(c) A gives S event-id e, group size n, threshold
d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, message M , and a set Y of
n public keys all of which are query outputs
of J O. S picks randomly a subset V of Y
with |V| = d, such that V is not contained in
any of the queries to SO and CO. Let X be
a set of secret keys with |X | = d and whose
corresponding public keys are all contained in
V. S computes σ 0 = Sign (e, n, d, Y, V, X ,
M ).
(d) A queries the oracles adaptively. Suppose A
makes a total number of v 0 queries to CO. The
restriction is that: v 0 < n − d − v. If any of
the queries to CO(pk) contains a public key
pk such that pk ∈ V, or to SO(e, ·, ·, ·, V 0 , ·)
such that V ∩ V 0 6= Ø, S halts.
(e) A outputs an index π̂.

Notions of Security of Linkable Threshold
Ring Signature

Security of LTRS schemes has four aspects: unforgeability, anonymity, linkability and non-slanderability. Before giving their definition, we consider the following
oracles which together model the ability of the adversaries in breaking the security of the schemes.
•

•

•

Linkable-Anonymity.
Anonymity for LTRS schemes is defined in the
following game between the Simulator S and the
Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles
J O, CO and SO:

pki ← J O(⊥). The Joining Oracle, on request,
adds a new user to the system. It returns the public
key pk ∈ PK of the new user.
ski ← CO(pki ). The Corruption Oracle, on input a
public key pki ∈ PK that is a query output of J O,
returns the corresponding secret key ski ∈ SK.
σ 0 ← SO(e, n, d, Y, V, M ). The Signing Oracle, on
input an event-id e, a group size n, a threshold
d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys, a signer
subset V of Y with |V| = d, and a message M ,
returns a valid signature σ 0 .

We denote by
1.

Unforgeability. Unforgeability for LTRS
schemes is defined in the following game between
the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A
is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param.
(b) A may query the oracles according to any
adaptive strategy.
(c) A gives S an event-id e ∈ EID, a group size
n ∈ N, a threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of
n public keys in PK, a message M ∈ M and
a signature σ ∈ Σ.
A wins the game if:
(1) Verify(e, n, d, Y, M, σ)=accept
(2) All of the public keys in Y are query outputs
of J O
(3) At most (d − 1) of the public keys in Y have
been input to CO
(4) σ is not a query output of SO.
We denote by
Advunf
A (λ) = Pr[A wins the game ]
The Computer Journal,

(λ) = Pr[π̂ ∈ V] −
AdvAnon
A

d
n − (v + v 0 )

Definition 3.2 (Linkable-anonymity). A LTRS
scheme is linkably-anonymous if for any PPT
adversary A, AdvAnon
(λ) is negligible.
A

3.

Note: We will further show how to enhance the
security into Insider Security for Anonymity in
Section 5.2.
Linkability.
Linkability for LTRS schemes is compulsory, that
is, it should be infeasible for a set of signers
to generate two signatures such that they are
determined to be unlinked using LTRS.Link. The
following definition/game essentially captures a
scenario that an adversary tries to generate two
LTRS signatures, say a (d1 , n1 )-threshold linkable
ring signature and a (d2 , n2 )-threshold linkable
ring signature, using strictly fewer than d1 + d2
user secret keys, so that these two signatures are
determined to be unlinked using LTRS.Link. If the
LTRS scheme is unforgeable (as defined above),
then these signatures can only be generated if
at least d1 and d2 user secret keys are known,
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uses the secret keys X corresponding to V
to run Sign(e, n, d, Y, X , M ) and to produce
a signatures σ 0 .
(d) A queries oracles with arbitrary interleaving.
Except at most d − 1 members of V can be
queries to CO, or included in the insider set of
any query to SO. In particular, A is allowed
to query any public keys which is not in V to
CO.
(e) A delivers group size n∗ , threshold d∗ , a set
of n∗ public keys Y ∗ , a message M ∗ and a
signature σ ∗ 6= σ 0 .

respectively. If less than d1 +d2 user secret keys are
known, then there must be at least one common
signer to both of the signatures. Therefore, this
model can effectively capture the definition of
individual-linkability given in [26, 21]. Note that
it is different from the definition of coalitionlinkability for LTRS schemes.
Linkability for LTRS scheme is defined in the
following game between the Simulator S and the
Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles
J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param.
(b) A may query the oracles according to any
adaptive strategy.
(c) A gives S an event-id e ∈ EID, group sizes
n1 , n2 ∈ N (w.l.o.g. we assume n1 ≤ n2 ),
thresholds d1 ∈ {1, . . . , n1 }, d2 ∈ {1, . . . , n2 },
sets Y1 and Y2 of public keys in PK of sizes
n1 and n2 resp., messages M1 , M2 ∈ M and
signatures σ1 , σ2 ∈ Σ.

A wins the game if
(1) Verify(e, n∗ , d∗ , Y ∗ , M ∗ , σ ∗ ) = accept
(2) σ ∗ is not an output of SO
(3) All of the public keys in Y ∗ , Y are query
outputs of J O
(4) None of the public keys in V have been input
to CO
(5) Link(σ ∗ , σ 0 ) = linked.
We denote by

A wins the game if

S
AdvN
A (λ) = Pr[A wins the game ]

(1) All public keys in Y1 ∪ Y2 are query outputs
of J O
(2) Verify(e, ni , di , Yi , Mi , σi ) = accept for i = 1, 2
such that σi are not outputs of SO
(3) CO has been queried less than d1 + d2 times
(4) Link(σ1 , σ2 )= unlinked.
We denote by
(λ) = Pr[A wins the game ]
AdvLink
A
Definition 3.3 (Individual-Linkability). A
LTRS scheme is individually-linkable if for all
PPT adversary A, AdvLink
is negligible.
A
4.

5

Non-Slanderability.
Non-slanderability ensures that no signer can
generate a signature which is determined to be
linked by LTRS.Link with another signature which
is not generated by the signer. In other words, it
prevents adversaries from framing honest users.

Definition 3.4 (Non-Slanderability). A LTRS
scheme is non-slanderable if for all PPT adversary
S
A, AdvN
A is negligible.
Summarizing we have:
Definition 3.5 (Security of LTRS Schemes). A
LTRS scheme is secure if it is unforgeable, linkablyanonymous, linkable and non-slanderable.
4.

Intuition. We modify the Fujisaki traceable ring
signature [27] which is inherited from [32, 33, 34] and
turn it into Linkable Threshold Ring Signature Scheme.
We make use of the following observations:
•

Non-Slanderability for LTRS schemes is defined in
the following game between the Simulator S and
the Adversary A in which A is given access to
oracles J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param.
(b) A may query the oracles according to any
adaptive strategy.
(c) A gives S an event e, group size n, threshold
d, a set of n public keys Y, a set of d insiders
V ⊆ Y, a message M . No member of V
has been queried to CO or has been included
in the insider set of any query to SO. S
The Computer Journal,

OUR PROPOSED THRESHOLD AND
LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE SCHEME

•

We do not need the traceable property of the
Fujisaki traceable ring signature. Therefore, we
do not need the n linkability tags of the Fujisaki
traceable ring signature. We also drop the NIZK
and NIWI proofs related to the n linkability tags.
We only need one linkability tag for our linkability
property. Therefore our signature is much shorter
than the Fujisaki traceable ring signature.
Note that the modification is not trivial! We
need to re-design the linking tag in order to make it
secure and more efficient. Therefore the approach
of our linking tag is totally different from the
Fujisaki scheme. Although we take the same
assumptions as the Fujisaki scheme, the security
proof of our scheme is also different from their
scheme.
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Our Link algorithm is more efficient than the Trace
algorithm of the Fujisaki traceable ring signature.
It is because the Fujisaki traceable ring signature
has n times more linkability tags than our proposal.
We also give a new method for efficient comparison
of linkability tags. Our linking complexity is
O(d log d), which becomes a constant if we set
the threshold value d to 1, while Fujisaki scheme
requires O(n log n). Detailed comparison result is
presented in Section 5.3.
We observe that linkable ring signature implies
threshold ring signature. It is because if there is
d linkable ring signatures for the same message
and linkable tag which are not linked with each
other, then it implies that there are d distinct
signers out of the n public keys. However, we
still need to connect all linkable ring signatures
together. Otherwise, the linkable ring signature
of a signer can be extracted and used to generate
another threshold ring signature (which breaks the
non-slander security). It can be done by each signer
signing on the one-time verification keys from d
signers.

Denote pk(j,k) as the public key at the j-th row and
the k-th column.
Each signer i generates (vki , ski ) ← OTGen(1λ ),
which is a pair of verification key and signing key
for a one-time signature scheme. We assume vk can
be represented by an element in ZN . All signers
firstly publish their own vki .
For each signer i with private key (xi , di ), we
denote (j 0 , k 0 ) as the index of pki in the matrix.
He computes the following:
1.
2.

C = yi hr ,

di +r

(Note that π1 is a NIWI proof that σvk is
a BB signature.)
(b) Calculate
di +r

KeyGen: For user i, he picks a random xi , di ∈ ZN .
His public key is yi = g xi hdi and his secret key is
(xi , di ).

•

Sign: On input (e, n, d, Y, X , M ), suppose Y =
{pk1 , . . . , pkn } is the user ring. X is the set
of private keys of d participating signers, who
cooperate to generate a (d, n) linkable threshold
ring signature for the message M with an event-id
√
e. We arrange Y as a ν ×ν matrix, where ν = n.5

π3 = h0 xi +τ .

(Note that π2 is a NIWI proof that σT
is a BB signature. π3 is the proof that
the signer cannot make another σT0 6= σT
such that (σT0 )q = (σT )q .)
(c) Pick some random rl ← ZN and calculate
Cl = hrl ,

πlC = (g −1 hrl )rl

for 1 ≤ l ≤ ν, l 6= j 0 . Then set
X
rj 0 = −
rl ,
Cj 0 = ghrj0 ,
l6=j 0
0

0

and πjC0 = (ghrj )rj .
(Note that Cj 0 is a commitment to g while
other Cl are commitments to 1. The
proofs πlC are NIWI proofs that Cl are
commitments to g or 1.)
(d) Pick some random sm ← ZN and
calculate
Bm = pk

(j 0 ,m)

sm

h

,

B
πm

=g

−sm

ν
Y

pk(l,m) )rl

l=1

for 1 ≤ m ≤ ν.
(Note that Bm are commitments to the
public keys in row j 0 of the matrix. The
B
proofs πm
are NIWI proofs that Bm are
commitments to the public keys in row
j 0 .)

4 A one-time signature is a signature that its unforgeability is
under a one-time chosen-message attack. That is, the adversary
is only allowed to make at most one query to its signing oracle.
5 Without loss of generality, we assume n is a square. If n is
not a square, we simply repeat pk1 sufficiently many times until
n is a square.

The Computer Journal,
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π2 = g xi +τ ,

Setup: The setup algorithm runs the bilinear group
generator (N = pq, G, GT , ê) ← G(λ). Suppose
the group generator G also gives the generators
g, h, h0 ∈ G.
The event ID space is EID , the message space
is M and the signature space is Σ. Let (OTGen,
OTSign, OTVerify) be a secure one-time signature
scheme4 [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. The message
space of the OTSign
is (EID × M × N × |pk|n ×
√
d
|vk| × (7 + 6 n)G), where |pk| is size of a public
key, |vk| is the size of a one-time verification
key and n is the number of public keys in the
ring signature. Let H : EID → ZK be a
collision resistant hash function, where K is a
security parameter. The public parameters are
(N, G, GT , ê, g, h, h0 , H).

•

L = σvk hs

π1 = g (vki +xi )s g xi +vki h(di +r)s .

Construction. We give our linkable threshold ring
signatures as follows:
•

Compute τ = H(e). Calculate the linkability
1
tag σT = g xi +τ .
1
Calculate the BB signature σvk = g xi +vki and
give some NIWI proofs πLT RS as follows
(a) Pick a random r, s ∈ ZN and calculate
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(e) Pick some random tm
calculate
tm

Dm = h

D
πm

,

= (g

←

ZN and

2.

Compute τ = H(e). Verify that
ê(g τ C, σT ) = ê(g, g) · ê(h, π2 )

and

−1 tm tm

)

h

ê(σT , h0 ) = ê(g, π3 )

0

for 1 ≤ m ≤ ν, m 6= k .
P
Then set tk0 = − m6=k0 tm , Dk0 = ghtk0
0
0
and πkD0 = (ghtk )tk .
(Note that Dk0 is a commitment to g
while other Dm are commitments to 1.
D
are NIWI proofs that Dm
The proofs πm
are commitments to g or 1.)
(f) Calculate

3.

Verify that

4.

ê(Cl , Cl g −1 ) = ê(h, πlC )
Qν
for all 1 ≤ l ≤ ν and l=1 Cl = g.
Compute
Am =

ν
Y

ê(Cl , pkl,m )

l=1
ν 
Y

πC = g sk0 −r

pk(j 0 ,m) hsm

tm

and verify that

.

m=1

B
Am = ê(g, Bm )ê(h, πm
)

(Note that πC is a NIWI proof that
ν
Y

ê(Bm , Dm )

5.

for all 1 ≤ m ≤ ν.
Verify that

6.

D
ê(Dm , Dm g −1 ) = ê(h, πm
)
Qν
for all 1 ≤ m ≤ ν and m=1 Dm = g.
Compute

m=1

3.
4.

is a commitment to pkj 0 ,k0 .)
(g) Output πLT RS
=
(C, L, π1 , π2 , π3 ,
{Ci , πiC , Bi , πiB , Di , πiD }1≤i≤ν , πC )
Produce the one-time signature σOT =
OTSignski (e, M, d, Y, {vk1 , . . . , vkd }, σT , πLT RS )
Output the signature (vki , σT , πLT RS , σOT )
on the message M with respect to event and
Y.

For the d participating signers, they all generate
their own linkable ring signature on the same
message M and event e.
Therefore, the
final ring signature includes {vk` , σT,` , πLT RS,` ,
0
σOT,` } for 1 ≤ ` ≤ d. Notice that σT,`
√ 6= σT,`
for all ` 6= `0 . The signature size is O(d n).
•

Verify: On input (e, n, d, Y, M, σ), first compute
τ = H(e) and parse σ = {vk` , σT,` , πLT RS,` , σOT,` }
for 1 ≤ ` ≤ d. Output accept if all of the following
holds
σT,` 6= σT,`0 for all ` 6= `0 ,
accept ← OTVerifyvk` (σOT,` , e, M, d, Y, {vk1 , . . . ,
vkd }, σT,` , πLT RS,` ) for some 1 ≤ ` ≤ d,
πLT RS,` is a valid NIWI proof for 1 ≤ ` ≤ d.
The details of checking each
πLT RS,`

=

(C, L, π1 , π2 , π3 , {Ci , πiC , Bi , πiB , Di ,
πiD }1≤i≤ν , πC )

is as follows:
1.

Verify that
ê(g vk` C, L) = ê(g, g) · ê(h, π1 )
The Computer Journal,

A=

ν
Y

ê(Bm , Dm )

m=1

and verify that
A = ê(g, C)ê(h, πC )
7.
•

Return accept if all of the above steps verify
correctly. Otherwise, output reject.

Link: On input two signatures σ1 , σ2 for two
messages M1 , M2 and the same event event,
(1)
(2)
suppose σT,` and σT,` are from σ1 and σ2
(1)

respectively, for 1 ≤ ` ≤ d. We use σT,` to
build a binary search tree. The average and
worst case complexity is O(d log d). Then for each
(2)
σT,` , we look up the binary search tree to search
for duplicate entry. Each lookup operation has
complexity O(log d). If there is any duplicate,
output linked. Otherwise, output unlinked. The
overall complexity is O(d log d).
Remark: The complexity of the Link protocol in
Fujisaki ring signature is O(n2 ). Even if we apply
the binary search tree method to their scheme, the
complexity is still O(n log n).
Theorem 4.1. The threshold linkable ring signature
scheme is unforgeable against insider corruption under
the subgroup decision assumption in Gq , the qs + KSDH assumption in Gp and the unforgeability of onetime signature.
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Theorem 4.2. The linkable threshold ring signature
scheme is linkably-anonymous if the K-DDHI assumption holds in GN .
Theorem 4.3. The threshold linkable ring signature
scheme is individually-linkable if the subgroup decision
assumption holds in Gp and Gq , and the threshold
linkable ring signature scheme is unforgeable.
Theorem 4.4. The threshold linkable ring signature
scheme is non-slanderable if the subgroup decision
assumption holds in Gq , the SDH assumption holds in
Gp and the one-time signature scheme is unforgeable.
The proofs of the theorems are given in the Appendix.
5.
5.1.

FURTHER ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
Linkable or Threshold Ring Signatures

Our linkable threshold ring signature is constructed
from a linkable ring signature, and uses the linkability
tag for threshold signing. Therefore, our proposal can
also be used to construct linkable ring signature (with
single signer) and threshold ring signature (which is
unlinkable).
•

•

To turn our construction into a linkable ring
signature, we can simply set d = 1 in our
construction.
To turn our construction into a threshold ring
signature which is unlinkable, we can use a nonce
to replace the event-id. This nonce can be chosen
by an arbitrary signer, and this number should
not be re-used. By the linkability property of
our construction, we can achieve the threshold
property since all signers calculate a linkability
tag on the same nonce for each Sign operation.
By the non-slander property of our construction,
different runs of the Sign protocol give threshold
ring signatures which are not linked. It is because
the signatures are signed on different nonce (eventid).

to consider if the communication between the d signers
is known to the adversary during the generation of the
challenge signature. We also have to consider the case
that the adversary can participate in the generation
of the challenge signature, by acting as some of the
d signers. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no
threshold ring signatures in the literature considered
this insider attack from the adversary. Their security
model implies a secure channel between the signers and
all signers are honest during the generation of threshold
ring signatures [43]. However, it may not be true in the
real world. Therefore, we propose a new security model
for anonymity against full key exposure and insider
attack. The security game is modified as follows.
Linkable-Anonymity. Anonymity for LTRS schemes
is defined in the following game between the Simulator
S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to
oracles J O, CO and SO:
1.
2.

3.

4.

Therefore we have threshold and/or linkable ring
signature.
5.
5.2.

S generates and gives A the system parameters
param.
A may query the oracles according to any adaptive
strategy. Suppose A makes a total number of v
queries to CO. The restriction is that: v < n − d.
A gives S event-id e, group size n, threshold d ∈
{1, . . . , n}, message M , a set Y of n public keys all
of which were query outputs of J O, and a subset
D ⊂ Y of d0 < d public keys all of which were query
inputs to CO. S picks randomly a subset V of Y
with |V| = d − d0 , such that V is not contained
in any of the queries to SO and CO. (Note that
D ∩ V = Ø).
Let V̄ and D̄ be a set of secret keys whose
corresponding public keys are all contained in V
and D respectively. S runs the Sign(e, n, d, Y, V̄ ∪
D̄, M ) protocol with A, with S runs as the signers
in V and A runs as the signers in D. Eventually,
the challenge signature σ 0 is outputted to A.
A queries the oracles adaptively. Suppose A makes
a total number of v 0 queries to CO. The restriction
is that: v 0 < n − d − v. If any of the queries to
CO(pk) contains a public key pk such that pk ∈ V,
or to SO(e, ·, ·, ·, V 0 , ·) such that V ∩ V 0 6= Ø, S
halts.
A outputs an index π̂.

Insider Security for Anonymity

For the security model of anonymity for threshold ring
signatures (either linkable or not) in the literature,
we only consider the anonymity similar to the ring
signatures with a single signer. It means that the
adversary is given a challenge signature of a ring of n
signers, the adversary guesses who is one of the d real
signers. It is known as the basic anonymity [42]. If all
secret keys of the ring are known to the adversary, it is
called the anonymity against full key exposure [42]. Our
scheme is proved under this security model.
However, anonymity for threshold ring signatures is
more complicated than the single signer case. We have
The Computer Journal,

We denote by
AdvAnon
(λ) = Pr[π̂ ∈ V] −
A

d − d0
.
n − (v + v 0 )

Definition 5.1 (Linkable-anonymity under Full
Key Exposure and Insider Attack). A LTRS scheme
is linkably-anonymous against full key exposure and
insider attack if for any PPT adversary A, AdvAnon
(λ)
A
is negligible.
We can define the anonymity under full key exposure
and insider attack for ring signatures (which is
unlinkable) similarly.
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Theorem 5.1. Our linkable threshold ring signature
scheme is linkably-anonymous under full key exposure
and insider attack if the K-DDHI assumption holds in
GN .
The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof
of theorem 4.2. For the challenge signature, we can see
that all communications between signers are the NIWI
proofs. Therefore, the adversary cannot use it to break
the anonymity of the scheme.
5.2.1.

Insider Security of Other Threshold Ring
Signatures.
For most threshold ring signature schemes, there
exists a party who is responsible to generate the
“partial” signatures (part of the final signatures) for
the non-participating members in the ring. These
“partial” signatures are generated from the public key
/ identities of those non-participating members. And
these “partial” signatures are indistinguishable from the
partial signatures generated from the real signers (which
require the secret key of those signers). Examples can
be found in [11, 21, 44, 45, 26, 43]. Therefore, this party
knows who are the real signers. Previous security model
does not capture the attack that the adversary is acting
as this party.
5.3.

Comparison

Linkable Threshold Ring Signatures. Tsang et al.
[21] proposed the first linkable threshold ring signature
scheme based on the strong RSA problem and the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Tsang et al.
[26] proposed another linkable threshold ring signature
scheme which has similar complexity and is secure
under the same assumptions. These two schemes are
secure in the random oracle model (ROM) only.
Our proposal is secure in the standard model
under the SDH assumption, the subgroup decision
assumption, the DDHI assumption and the security of
the one-time signature (OTS) scheme. Our proposal
is
√
more efficient than the previous schemes if d < n. It is
possible in the real world applications, when the signers
are concern about their anonymity. For example, a
10-out-of-1000 threshold ring signature appears to be
“more anonymous” to a 10-out-of-100 threshold ring
signature. The size of the ring n is much larger the
number of the actual signers d, then our proposal is
more efficient.
Moreover, the size of all linkability tags is O(d) in
our scheme, while it is O(n) in other schemes. Therefore, the running time of the Link protocol is smaller
in our scheme. Since we propose an optimization of
the Link protocol, the running time is further reduced
to O(d log d). We summerize the comparison in Table 1.
Threshold Ring Signatures. Bresson et al. [11]
proposed the threshold ring signature scheme based on
The Computer Journal,
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the RSA problem. However, this scheme is not efficient.
Liu et al. [45] proposed a threshold ring signature using
Shamir secret sharing. The security of the scheme is
based on the discrete logarithm (DL) and the RSAcollision problem. Tsang et al. [26] proposed the first
identity-based threshold ring signature, whose security
is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
problem. Tsang et al. also pointed out a flaw in
the security proof of the identity-based threshold ring
signature by Han et al. [46]. Tsang et al. [26] proposed
a threshold ring signature, whose security is based on
the strong RSA problem and DDH problem.
Melchor et al. [47] and Dallot and Vergnaud [48]
proposed threshold ring signatures based on coding
theory. The security of the scheme of Melchor et al.
[47] is based on the Minimum Distance problem, while
the security of the scheme of Dallot and Vergnaud [48] is
based on the Goppa Parameterized Bounded Decoding
(GPBD) problem and Goppa Code Distinguisher (GD).
Cayrel et al. [49] proposed a lattice-based threshold
ring signatures. The security is based on the Short
Integer Solution problem.
Yuen et al. [43] proposed the first threshold ring signatures in the standard model. The security is based
on the CDH problem. We summerize the comparison
in Table 2.
Linkable Ring Signatures. Liu et al. [16] proposed
the first linkable ring signature scheme based on the
DL problem and the DDH problem.
Tsang and
Wei [18] proposed a linkable ring signature, whose
security is based on the link decisional RSA (LDRSA) problem and the DDH. Liu and Wong [19]
proposed a linkable ring signature, whose security
is based on the DL problem and the DDH. Au et
al. [23] improved the scheme [21] by showing the
new scheme is secure in a stronger security model,
under the LD-RSA assumption, the DDH assumption
and the strong RSA assumption.
Zheng et al.
[25] proposed a linkable ring signatures from linear
feedback shift register. Its security is based on the
state-based DL (S-DL) assumption and the statebased decisional product Diffie-Hellman (S-DPDH)
assumption. Recently, Fujisaki [27] proposed the first
linkable ring signature scheme without random oracles
which relies on various assumptions. We summerize the
comparison in Table 3.
6.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented the first linkable threshold
ring signature (LTRS) without random oracles. When
compared to previous LTRS schemes (which are only
secure in the random oracle model), we also enjoy
significant efficiency improvement. Our scheme can
be regarded as a “regular” threshold ring signature
scheme (i.e., without linkability). The signature size of
our scheme is shorter than all previous threshold ring
Vol. ??,

No. ??,

????

10

T. H. Yuen, Joseph K. Liu, M. H. Au, W. Susilo, J. Zhou

Scheme
Tsang et al. [21]
Tsang et al. [26]
Our scheme
a

TABLE 1. Comparison of (d, n)-Linkable Threshold Ring Signatures
Signature Security
Model
Linking
Sign
Size
Complexity Computationa
O(n)
strong RSA, DDH ROM
O(n2 )
2(n + d)E + 2(n − d)M
O(n)
strong RSA, DDH ROM
O(n2 )
(n + 4d)E + 4nM
√
√
O(d n)
SDH, Subgp,
standard O(d log d)
(8d + 4d n)E+
√
DDHI, OTS
(4d + 2d n)M + dOTS

Verify
Computationa
3nM
5nM
2dE + 8d(1+
√
n)P + dOTV

When we come across the computation of sign and verify, we use E to represent an exponentiation, M to represent a
multi-bases exponentiation which is equal to the cost of approximate 1.3 exponentation, P to represent a pairing, OTS
to represent a one-time signature signing and OTV to represent a one-time signature verification.

Scheme
Bresson et al. [11]
Liu et al. [45]
Chow et al. [44]
Melchor et al. [47]
Dallot and Vergnaud [48]
Tsang et al. [26, 21]
Cayrel et al. [49]
Yuen et al. [43]
Our scheme

TABLE 2. Comparison of (d, n)-Threshold Ring Signatures
Signature
Security
Model
Sign
Size
Computationa
O(n log n) RSA
ROM
(d2d log n)C + dC
+(n2d log n)E + nE
O(n)
DL,
ROM
dE + (n − d)M (DL Ver.)
RSA-Collision
dE + (n − d)E (RSA Ver.)
O(n)
CDH
ROM
nE + nM
O(n)
Minimum
ROM
O(n2 ) matrix op.b
Distance
O(n)
GPBD, GD
ROM
n matrix op. +nC
O(n)
strong RSA,
ROM
2(n + d)E + 2(n − d)M ([21])
DDH
(n + 4d)E + 4nM ([26])
O(n)
Short Integer
ROM
O(n log n) matrix op.c
Solution
O(n)
CDH
standard (n + d + 1)E + (n + d)M
√
√
O(d n)
SDH, Subgp,
standard (8d + 4d n)E+
√
DDHI, OTS
(4d + 2d n)M + dOTS

Verify
Computationa
(d2d log n)C
+(d2d log n)E
nM (DL Ver.)
nE (RSA Ver.)
nE + (n + 1)P
O(n2 ) matrix op.b
n matrix op. +nC
3nM ([21])
5nM ([26])
O(n log n) matrix op.c
(3n + 3)P + E
2dE + 8d(1+
√
n)P + dOTV

a

Same as Table 1, when we come across the computation of sign and verify, we use E to represent an exponentiation, M to
represent a multi-bases exponentiation and P to represent a pairing. In addition, we use C to represent a symmetric cipher
operation.
b
The scheme in [47] is based on coding theory. The signing and verification processes require 140m2 n matrix operations as
described in their paper. The size of the matrix is m × (m − k) where m, k are some security parameters.
c
The scheme in [49] is also based on coding theory. The authors stated that if n = 100, the required number of runs of matrix
operation is about 111 for signing and verification for an acceptable security level.

Scheme
Liu et al. [16]
Tsang and Wei [18]
Liu and Wong [19]
Au et al. [23]
Zheng et al. [25]
Tsang et al. [26, 21]

TABLE 3. Comparison of (1, n)-Linkable Ring
Signature Security
Model
Linking
Size
Complexity
O(n)
DL, DDH
ROM
O(1)
O(1)
LD-RSA, DDH
ROM
O(1)
O(n)
DL, DDH
ROM
O(1)
O(1)
LD-RSA, DDH, ROM
O(1)
strong RSA
O(n)
S-DL, S-DPDH
ROM
O(1)
O(n)
strong RSA,
ROM
O(n2 )
DDH

Fujisaki [27]

√
O( n)

Our scheme

√
O( n)

SDH, Subgp,
DDHI, OTS

standard

O(n log n)

SDH, Subgp,
DDHI, OTS

standard

O(1)

Signatures
Sign
Computationa
2(n − 1)M + 3E
(2 + n)E + 7M
E + 2M
(2 + n)E + 7M
(14n + 2) seq. op.b
2(n + 1)E
+2(n − 1)M ([21])
(n + 4)E
+4nM ([26])
√
(6 + 13 n)E
√
+(5 + n + 2 n)M
√
+2 nP + OTS
√
(8 + 4 n)E+
√
(4 + 2 n)M + OTS

a

Verify
Computationa
2nM
7M
2M
7M
(14n + 2) seq. op.b
3nM ([21])
5nM ([26])
nM
√
+(8 + 2n + 12 n)P
+OTV
2E + 8(1+
√
n)P + 1

Same as Table 1, when we come across the computation of sign and verify, we use E to represent an exponentiation, M to
represent a multi-bases exponentiation and P to represent a pairing.
b
The scheme in [25] relies on Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and the computations are sequence operations.

The Computer Journal,

Vol. ??,

No. ??,

????

Efficient Linkable and/or Threshold Ring Signature without Random Oracles
√
signature schemes if d < n. Furthermore, if we set
the threshold value to be 1, our scheme is a (1-out-of-n)
linkable ring signature scheme. The linking complexity
of our scheme is much faster than the Fujisaki scheme,
which is the only linkable ring signature scheme secure
in the standard model.
We also enhanced the security model of threshold ring
signature scheme, by allowing the adversary to be any
insider interacting with other participating signers. We
claim that this security model should be more practical
in the real life.
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APPENDIX A.

ON THE “ATTACK” OF
LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE BY WANG AND
ZHAO [45]

In [28], the authors claimed all existing linkable
ring signature schemes suffer from linkability attack.
Specifically, it is claimed that a malicious signer
can generate two ring signatures that are not linked
together. This break the requirement of linkability. It
is also claimed that a malicious signer can generate a
signature that is linked to another signature generated
by an honest signer. This break the requirement of nonslanderability.
A careful look into the paper reveals that the attacks
are carried out in a different model which, we think is
just too strong and unreasonable.
Using the terminology of the paper, the malicious
signer is in fact holding two secret keys, xπ and xs ,
of the members in the ring. In the attack against
linkability, the malicious signer first obtains a signature
σ which originates from singer whose secret key is xs .
Next, the malicious signer uses a seperate secret key xπ
to generate another signature σ1 . The authors go on to
claim that this malicious signer has successfully broken
the linkability property since σ and σ1 does not linked
together. This claim is unreasonable since someone
holding two secret keys should be allowed to generate
two ring signatures that are not linked together.
The so-called attack against non-slanderability works
in a similar fashion. In the attack, the malicious signer
obtains a signature σ from the signing oracle where
the secret key of its signer is xs . Strangely, it is
assumed that, in this attack, the value of xs is known
to this malicious signer. This attacker simply generates
another signature σ 0 using the knowledge of xs . Of
course, σ and σ 0 links together and the authors claimed
Vol. ??,
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that this malicious singer has successfully broken the
non-slanderability property. This claim is unreasonable
since the attacker knows the secret key of the victim
and thus it is entirely possible for him/her to slander
the victim.
APPENDIX B.
Appendix B.1.

SECURITY PROOF
Proof of Theorem 4.1

Proof. Let G0 be the original unforgeability game. Let
G1 be the same as G0 , except that h is selected from
the sub-group Gq instead of G. If the subgroup decision
assumption holds, the adversary A cannot distinguish
G0 and G1 . Now we simulate G1 as follows.
Setup.
The simulator S runs the bilinear group
generator (N = pq, G, GT , ê) ← G(1λ ). Suppose D is
the challenger of the BB signature in Gp and S tries to
forge a BB signature.
Firstly, S runs (vki , ski ) ← OTGen(λ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ qs .
According to the weak unforgeability model of the BB
signature, S gives {1, . . . , K}, {vk1 , . . . , vkqs } as the
“message” of the BB signature. D gives the public
parameter gp and the public key gpα of the BB signature
to S. D also gives the BB signatures for all these
messages to S.
1/q
Denote g = gp . S can calculate g α = (gpα )1/q .
S picks a random β ∈ ZN and h ∈ Gq using p. S
sets h0 = g β . Finally, S randomly chooses a collision
resistant hash function H : EID → ZK . Then S gives
the public parameters (N, G, GT , ê, g, h, h0 , H) to the
adversary A.
Assume that A makes qj query to J O. S picks τ ∗ as
the challenge signer. For i = 1, . . . , qj , S picks random
xi , di ∈ ZN and sets:
(
g xi hdi
if i 6= τ ∗ ,
pki =
(g α )hdi if i = τ ∗ .
S stores the set of public keys {pki }ni=1 .
Oracle Simulation. S simulates the oracles as follows:
•
•
•

J O: on the i-th query, S returns pki .
CO(pki ): If i = τ ∗ , S declares failure and exits.
Otherwise, S returns (xi , di ).
SO(e, n, d, Y, V, M ): On input a message M , a set
of n public keys Y = {pki0 }ni=1 , and a set of d signers
V, S calculates all {vk` , σT,` , πLT RS,` , πOT,` }
according to the Sign algorithm, for all pk` ∈ V
and ` 6= τ ∗ . If pkτ ∗ ∈ V, S calculates τ = H(e) ∈
{1, . . . , K}. S retrieves the BB signatures σvki and
σT for messages vki and τ , respectively. S uses
σvki and dτ ∗ to compute:
L = σvki hs ,

dτ ∗ +r (dτ ∗ +r)s
π1 = (g vki g α )s σvk
h
.
i

S uses σT and dτ ∗ to compute:
π2 = σTdτ ∗ +r ,

π3 = σTβ .
The Computer Journal,
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Finally, S calculates the rest of the signature
according to the Sign algorithm, using the one-time
signing key ski .
Output. A returns (e∗ , n∗ , d∗ , Y ∗ , M ∗ , σ ∗ ). If pkτ ∗ ∈
/
Y ∗ , then S aborts.
For each {vk` , σT,` , πLT RS,` , σOT,` }, where 1 ≤
` ≤ d, Denote πLT RS,` = (C, L, π1 , π2 , π3 , {Ci , πiC ,
Bi , πiB , Di , πiD }1≤i≤ν , πC ).
By raising ê(Cl , Cl g −1 ) = ê(h, πlC ) to the q-th power,
we can see that either Cl or Cl g −1 has order p. Since
Q
ν
l=1 Cl = g, we have one Cl committed to g and the
others are committed to 1. Denote such l as j ∗ . By
D
raising ê(Dm , Dm g −1 ) = ê(h, πm
) to the q-th power, we
−1
can
see
that
either
D
or
D
g
has order p. Since
m
m
Qν
m=1 Dm = g, we have one Dm committed to g and
the others
committed to 1. Denote such m as k ∗ .
Qare
ν
B
Since l=1 ê(Cl , vkl,m ) = ê(g, Bm )ê(h, πm
) for all
1 ≤ m ≤ ν, we can raise it to the q-th
power.
We have
Qν
ê(g, pkj ∗ ,m )q = ê(g, Bm )q . Since m=1 ê(Bm , Dm ) =
ê(g, C`∗ )ê(h, π C ), we can raise it to the q-th power. We
have ê(g, C)q = ê(Bk∗ , g)q = ê(g, pkj ∗ ,k∗ )q . Therefore
C is committed to pkj ∗ ,k∗ .
If pkj ∗ ,k∗ = pkτ ∗ , S raises ê(g vk C, L) = ê(g, g) ·
ê(h, π1 ) to the q-th power. We have
ê(g vk g α , L)q = ê(g, g)q .
If L is not a previous signing oracle output, then S
returns Lq as the forgery to the BB signature in Gp for
the “message” vk.
Otherwise (L is the same as the previous signing
oracle output), check if the corresponding σOT,` is the
same as the previous signing oracle output. If they
are not the same, it implies that σOT,` is a forgery
of the one-time signature for the verification key vk` .
If they are the same, observe that σOT,` is a one-time
signature on all verification keys {vk1 , . . . , vkd }. Since
the signature outputted by A cannot be the same as
the previous signing oracle output, then A must forge
a the one-time signature for some verification key vki ,
where i = 1, . . . , d.
If such pkj ∗ ,k∗ 6= pkτ ∗ for all πLT RS,` , then S aborts.
Analysis. The probability of not asking pkτ in the
corruption oracle is 1− qqcj . The probability of pkτ ∗ ∈ Y ∗
and pkj ∗ ,k∗ = pkτ ∗ for some πLT RS,` in the output
∗
phase is nd ∗ . Note that the BB signature is weakly
unforgeable if the SDH assumption holds. Therefore S
solves the qs + K-SDH problem, the subgroup decision
problem or forges a one-time signature with probability
qc
d∗
n∗ (1 − qj ), where qs , qc , qj is the number of SO, CO
and J O respectively.
Appendix B.2.

Proof of Theorem 4.2

Proof. Setup. The simulator S is given the K-DDHI
problem instance (N, G, GT , ê, g, A1 , A2 , . . . , AK ),
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where
( 1
g x+i
Ai =
1
g x+τ̄ or α ∈R G

if i 6= τ̄ ,
if i = τ̄ .
1

S is asked to determine whether Aτ̄ = g x+τ̄ or not. S
randomly picks β, γ ∈ ZN and sets
h = gβ ,

h0 = g γ .

Finally, S randomly chooses a collision resistant hash
function H : EID × {0, 1}∗ → ZK . Then S gives
the public parameters (N, G, GT , ê, g, h, h0 , H) to the
adversary A.
Assume that A makes qj = K query to J O. S picks
τ ∗ as the challenge signer. For i = 1, . . . , qj , S picks
random xi , di , x̄ ∈ ZN and sets:
(
g xi hdi if i 6= τ ∗ ,
pki =
g x̄
if i = τ ∗ .
S stores the set of public keys {pki }ni=1 . In the later
part, we will implicitly set pki = g x hdi , where x is
unknown from the problem instance. It implies that
di = (x̄ − x)/β, which is not known as well. We will
simulate the NIWI proofs without using x and di .
Oracle Simulation. S simulates the oracles as follows:
•
•
•

J O: on the i-th query, S returns pki .
CO(pki ): If i = τ ∗ , S declares failure and exits.
Otherwise, S returns (xi , di ).
SO(e, n, d, Y, V, M ): On input a message M , a set
of n public keys Y = {pki0 }ni=1 , and a set of d signers
V, S calculates all {vk` , σT,` , πLT RS,` , πOT,` }
according to the Sign algorithm, for all pk` ∈ V
and ` 6= τ ∗ .
If pkτ ∗ ∈ V, S runs (vk, sk) ← OTGen(λ) and
τ = H(e). If τ = τ̄ , then S declares failure and
exits. Otherwise, S uses Aτ from the problem
instance and the trapdoor β to complete the NIZK
proof. S picks r, L̄ ∈ ZN and computes:
σ T = Aτ ,
L̄

L=g ,

C = g x̄ hr ,
π1 = (g

π2 = (g −1 Aττ +x̄+βr )1/β ,

(vk+x̄+βr)L̄−1 1/β

)

,

π3 =

Challenge. At some point, A outputs a message M ∗ , an
event-id e∗ , a set of n∗ public keys Y ∗ and a threshold
d∗ . S picks a random subset V ∗ of Y ∗ with |V ∗ | = d∗ ,
such that

•

Output. If A can correct guess the index π̂ = τ ∗ , then
1
S outputs Aτ̄ = g x+τ̄ . Otherwise, S outputs Aτ̄ ∈ G.
Analysis.
In
the
challenge
signature
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
{vk`∗ , σT,`
, πLT
,
π
},
vk
and
π
are
from
RS,`
OT,`
`
OT,`
the one-time signature and hence do not contain any
∗
information about the signer’s secret key. πLT
RS,` is a
NIWI proof such that the commitments are perfectly
binding and the proofs are witness indistinguishable.
∗
The remaining part of the signature is σT,`
. Note that
pkτ ∗ is a random element in the set V ∗ . If A correctly guesses pkτ ∗ ∈ V ∗ with probability greater than
d∗
n∗ −(qc +qs ) , then S can solve the K-DDHI problem.
Note that the probability of not to abort during
1
1 qs
1
the simulation is K
(1 − K
) ≈ K
(1 − qKs ), where qs
is the number of signing oracle query. The value K
should be chosen in a way that K is large enough that
H : EID → ZK is a collision resistant hash function,
and K is small enough that the abort probability of
S is small. In addition, if K is smaller, the K-DDHI
assumption is weaker. For example, we can set K = 2qs .
The probability of not to abort is 2q1s . The size of
EID is restricted such that H : EID → ZK is collision
resistant.
Appendix B.3.

∗

pkτ ∗ ∈ V ;
any public key in V ∗ is not contained in any query
to CO;
there was no query to SO with input (e∗ , ·, ·, ·, V, ·),
where V ∩ V ∗ 6= Ø.
The Computer Journal,

Proof of Theorem 4.3

Proof. This theorem can be proven by a sequence of
games.
•
•
•

σTγ .

It is easy to check that π1 , π2 , π3 can pass the
verification. Finally, S calculates the rest of the
signature according to the Sign algorithm.

•
•

∗
∗
∗
S calculates all {vk`∗ , σT,`
, πLT
RS,` , πOT,` } according to
∗
the Sign algorithm, for all pk` ∈ V and ` 6= τ ∗ .
S runs (vk, sk) ← OTGen(λ) and τ = H(e∗ ). If
τ 6= τ̄ , then S declares failure and exits. Otherwise, S
uses Aτ̄ from the problem instance and the trapdoor β
to complete the Sign algorithm similar to the simulation
of the signing oracle. Finally, S returns the whole
challenge signature to A.

•
•

Let G0 be the original individual-linkability game.
Let G1 be the same as G0 , except that h is selected
from the sub-group Gq instead of G.
Let G2 be the same as G1 , except that A wins if
A wins in G1 and A can output a pair (σT , σT0 )
such that σT 6= σT0 and (σT )q = (σT0 )q , where
(σT , σT0 ) are from the signatures σ1 , σ2 returned by
A respectively.
Let G3 be the same as G2 , except that h is selected
from G instead of the sub-group Gq .
Let G4 be the same as G3 , except that h0 is selected
from the sub-group Gp instead of G.

If the subgroup decision assumption holds in Gq , the
adversary A cannot distinguish between G0 and G1 ,
between G2 and G3 , and between G3 and G4 .
Lemma B.1. The game G1 and G2 are indistinguishable if the threshold linkable ring signature scheme is
unforgeable.
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Proof. Setup. We first simulate G1 as follows. The
simulator S runs the bilinear group generator (N =
pq, G, GT , ê) ← G(1λ ). S picks a random β ∈ ZN
and h ∈ Gq using p. S sets h0 = g β . Finally, S
randomly chooses a collision resistant hash function
H : EID → ZK . Then S gives the public parameters
(N, G, GT , ê, g, h, h0 , H) to the adversary A.
Oracle Simulation. S honestly simulates the oracles
using the user secret keys.

From the verification, we also have ê(σT , h0 ) =
ê(g, π3 ) and ê(σT0 , h0 ) = ê(g, π30 ), where π3 and π30
are the corresponding NIWI proof for σT and σT0
respectively. Therefore we have
ê(gpa gqr , , h0 ) = ê(g, π3 ),

0

ê(gpa gqr , h0 ) = ê(g, π30 ).

If h0 ∈ Gp , then h0 = gpγ for a unknown γ ∈ ZN . Since
ê(gp , gq ) = 1 and ê(gp , gp ) 6= 1, we have
0

Output. A returns (e, n1 , n2 , d1 , d2 , Y1 , Y2 , M1 , M2 , σ1 , σ2 ).
Denote τ = H(e) and σb = {·, σT,b,` , πLT RS,b,` , ·},
where 1 ≤ ` ≤ db , b = 1, 2.
Denote
πLT RS,b,` = (Cb,` , ·, ·, π2,b,` , π3,b,` , ·, ·).
Similar to the proof of unforgeability, we can show
that Cb,` is a commitment to some public key g xi hdi ∈
Yb . S raises ê(g τ Cb,` , σT,b,` ) = ê(g, g) · ê(h, π2,b,` ) to the
q-th power. We have
ê(g τ g xi , σT,b,` )q = ê(g, g)q .
1

Therefore (σT,b,` )q = (g τ +xi )q .
Note that A is only given qc < d1 + d2 secret keys,
and σT,b,` cannot be the output of SO using the same
event e. If A wins the game, it means that all tags
σT,b,` are distinct. By the unforgeability property, there
exists at least a pair (σT , σT0 ) such that σT 6= σT0 and
1
(σT )q = (σT0 )q . (For example, if σT = g τ +xi , where
σT is not the output from SO and xi is not the output
from CO, it means that σT is a forgery.)
Therefore, we can see that if the threshold linkable
ring signature scheme is unforgeable, then A can win in
both game G1 and G2 . Therefore the extra winning
condition in G2 does not affect A’s probability of
winning.
Lemma B.2. There is no adversary who can win G4
with non-negligible probability if the subgroup decision
assumption holds in Gp .
Proof. Setup. We simulate G4 as follows. The simulator
S is given the subgroup decision problem instance
(N, G, GT , ê, g, h0 ). S picks a random β ∈ ZN . S
sets h = g β . Finally, S randomly chooses a collision
resistant hash function H : EID → ZK . Then S gives
the public parameters (N, G, GT , ê, g, h, h0 , H) to the
adversary A.
Oracle Simulation. S honestly simulates the oracles
using the user secret keys.
Output. If A wins the game G4 , it means that there
exists at least a pair (σT , σT0 ) such that σT 6= σT0 and
(σT )q = (σT0 )q . (Although such q is now unknown to
S.) Denote gp and gq as the generators of Gp and Gq
respectively. We can write
σT = gpa gqr ,

0

σT0 = gpa gqr ,

where a, r, r0 are some unknown integers in ZN and
r 6= r0 .
The Computer Journal,

ê(g, π3 ) = ê(gpa gqr , gpγ ) = ê(gpa , gpγ ) = ê(gpa gqr , gpγ ) = ê(g, π30 ).
Therefore π3 = π30 .
If h0 ∈ G, then h0 = gpγ gqδ for some unknown γ, δ ∈
ZN . Since ê(gp , gq ) = 1, ê(gp , gp ) 6= 1 and ê(gq , gq ) 6= 1,
we have
ê(g, π3 ) = ê(gpa gqr , gpγ gqδ ) = ê(gpa , gpγ ) · ê(gqr , gqδ ),
0

0

ê(g, π30 ) = ê(gpa gqr , gpγ gqδ ) = ê(gpa , gpγ ) · ê(gqr , gqδ ).
Since r 6= r0 , π3 6= π30 .
If A wins the game G4 , then S compares π3 with π30 .
If π3 = π30 for some signatures in A’s output σ1 and σ2 ,
then S outputs h0 ∈ Gq ; if π3 6= π30 for all signatures in
A’s output σ1 and σ2 , then S outputs h0 ∈ G.
Therefore if the subgroup decision assumption holds
in Gp , there is no adversary who can win G4 with nonnegligible probability.
Following the sequence of games, the theorem is
proven.
Appendix B.4.

Proof of Theorem 4.4

Proof. Let G0 be the original unforgeability game. Let
G1 be the same as G0 , except that h is selected from
the sub-group Gq instead of G. If the subgroup decision
assumption holds, the adversary A cannot distinguish
G0 and G1 .
Setup. Now we simulate G1 as follows. The simulator S
runs the bilinear group generator (N = pq, G, GT , ê) ←
G(1λ ). S picks a random β ∈ ZN and h ∈ Gq using
p. S sets h0 = g β . Finally, S randomly chooses a
collision resistant hash function H : EID → ZK . Then
S gives the public parameters (N, G, GT , ê, g, h, h0 , H)
to the adversary A.
Oracle Simulation. S honestly simulates the oracles
using the user secret keys.
Challenge. A gives S an event e, group size n, threshold
d, a set of n public keys Y, a set of d insiders V ⊆ Y, a
message M . S uses the corresponding user secret keys
to calculate the challenge signature σ 0 .
Output. A returns (n∗ , d∗ , Y ∗ , M ∗ , σ ∗ ). Suppose σ ∗ is
linked to σ 0 by some
∗
∗
∗
{vk ∗ , σT , πLT
RS , σOT } in the signature σ ,
0
0
0
{vk 0 , σT , πLT
RS , σOT } in the signature σ .
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∗
C
B
Denote πLT
RS = (C, L, π1 , π2 , π3 , {Ci , πi , Bi , πi , Di ,
D
πi }1≤i≤ν , πC ). Similar to the proof of unforgeability,
S can use q to show that C is committed to some pk =
∗
g x hd . After that, S raises ê(g τ C, σT ) = ê(g, g)·ê(h, π2 )
to the q-th power. We have
∗

ê(g τ g x , σT )q = ê(g, g)q .
1

Therefore (σT τ +x∗ )q = g q . Note that S honestly
1
0
τ +x0 = g. Therefore
generate πLT
RS . In particular, σT
τ +x0

(g τ +x∗ )q = g q .
It implies that x0 = x∗ .
∗
∗
Note that πLT
RS is a NIWI proof of witness x if the
SDH assumption holds (the proof is the same as that in
unforgeability). Since x∗ is not outputted by the CO,
∗
0
∗
A can only win by setting πLT
RS = πLT RS . Since vk
∗
0
is involved in the NIWI proof, it forces vk = vk . If
the one-time signature scheme is unforgeable, A cannot
∗
0
output a σOT
6= σOT
.
∗
Observe that d , M ∗ , {vk1∗ , . . . , vkd∗∗ }, Y ∗ (which implies n∗ ) are included as part of the message of the
one-time signature. Therefore, it implies that d = d∗ ,
M = M ∗ , vki = vki∗ for 1 ≤ i ≤ d∗ and Y = Y ∗ . It
means all the one-time verification keys are the same.
If σ ∗ 6= σ 0 , then it means that A has forged a one-time
signature for some verification key vki .
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